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THE EFFECTS OF GPS AND MOVING MAP DISPLAYS ON PILOT NAVIGATIONAL 
AWARENESS WHILE FLYING UNDER VFR 
 
Stephen M. Casner 
NASA Ames Research Center 
Mail Stop 262-4, Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000 
 
GPS and moving map displays are popularly believed to increase pilot navigational awareness – further 
empowering the already aware pilot with additional information about their position and surroundings. In a 
first experiment, pilots’ beliefs about their own navigational awareness were compared to their measured 
awareness while navigating along a cross-country route. The results demonstrate a familiar out-of-the-loop 
effect and a marked disparity between what pilots believed and how they performed. In a second 
experiment, different pilots were asked to more actively participate in the navigation process while 
performing the same navigational task.  The results indicate that this additional involvement significantly 
improved pilots’ measured awareness. Overall, the results call into question unqualified beliefs about GPS, 
moving maps, and navigational awareness, and highlight the need for pilots to understand the potential 




GPS and moving map displays are often claimed 
to increase pilots’ navigational awareness. These 
claims are partly justified by some obvious 
advantages offered by GPS and moving maps. 
One only need consider the problem of locating 
the nearest suitable airport in the event of an 
emergency. GPS receivers pinpoint the position 
of the aircraft while moving maps quickly help 
identify the best course of action. During this 
type of emergency, it is hard to imagine a more 
timely and useful information resource.   
 
Empirical studies have demonstrated a cost 
associated with not having to actively perform 
mental calculations and discriminations that are 
made automatically by a computer. Memory and 
awareness of information that is passively 
monitored has been shown to be significantly 
poorer than information that human operators 
generate themselves using mental problem 
solving and rehearsal [Slamecka and Graf, 1978; 
Glenberg et al, 1977; Craik and Lockhart, 1972].  
Observational studies of humans working with 
automation, in the aviation domain as well as 
others, have demonstrated poorer awareness 
among human operators who perform tasks with 
the assistance of automated systems [Uhlarik and 
Comerford, 2002; Endsley, 1996; Endsley and 
Kiris, 1995; Parasuraman, 1987].  These studies 
draw a common conclusion: in an effort to make 
the human operator more aware by providing 
more information through automation, we 





This experiment aimed to measure pilots’ beliefs 
about their own navigational awareness when 
using GPS and moving map displays, and to 
compare those beliefs to an objective measure of 




Sixteen pilots who had basic familiarity with 
GPS receivers and moving maps participated in 
the experiment.  All pilots reported that they did 
not have significant familiarity with the 





The experiment airplane was a Diamond DA40 
(Diamond Star) equipped with a panel-mounted 
GPS receiver and a color moving map display.  
All pilots were furnished with a current San 
Francisco sectional aeronautical chart that 
covered the area through which the experimental 
flight was conducted.  The experimenter had 
access to an additional GPS receiver that was 




The sixteen pilots were told that they had to 
complete a cross-country flight that consisted of 
a series of nine checkpoints. It was explained 
that the first three checkpoints were intended as 
practice checkpoints as pilots made their way out 
to a circuit of six additional checkpoints, located 
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in an unfamiliar area, that were of interest to the 
experimenter.  The last six checkpoints formed a 
closed circuit over which the data were to be 
collected. The most distant checkpoint was 
approximately 105 nautical miles from the  
origin airport. 
 
Pilots were instructed to fly as closely as 
possible to each checkpoint, and to report when 
they believed that they were directly over each 
checkpoint.  Pilots were briefed on the route 
prior to engine start at the origin airport.  A 
sectional aeronautical chart was used to point out 
the route including each of the nine checkpoints. 
 
Pilots navigated between all nine checkpoints 
along the flight in one of two different ways.   
 
Eight pilots were randomly assigned to the 
Pilotage group.  These pilots were given a San 
Francisco sectional aeronautical chart and were 
told that they would have to navigate by means 
of pilotage.  Pilotage is a technique in which the 
pilot must find his or her way by correlating 
geographical features depicted on a chart with 
geographical features seen out the window of the 
airplane.  These pilots were not permitted to use 
timers, calculators, plotters, or any other device 
that could facilitate navigation techniques other 
than pilotage (e.g., dead reckoning). 
 
Eight pilots were randomly assigned to the 
GPS/Moving Map group.  These pilots were 
given the same San Francisco aeronautical chart, 
but also used a panel-mounted GPS receiver that 
featured a moving map display.  It was verified 
that each pilot was familiar with the basic 
features of the GPS and moving map prior to 
departure.  The route consisting of all nine 
checkpoints was programmed into the GPS prior 
to takeoff. 
 
Upon departure, pilots were asked to verbally 
estimate their navigational awareness in two 
different situations:  (1) navigating using only a 
sectional chart; and (2) navigating using a 
sectional chart and a GPS receiver with a moving 
map display.  Note that each pilot in each group 
rated themselves in the situation in which they 
were currently flying, and in the situation 
experienced by pilots in the other experimental 
group.  Pilots estimated their navigational 
awareness using a 0-to-10 scale: 0 representing a 
total lack of awareness, and 10 representing 
perfect awareness.   
 
All sixteen pilots flew over the nine checkpoints 
as instructed.  All pilots were asked to announce 
when they believed they had reached each 
checkpoint.  Upon each pilot report, the 
experimenter used a GPS receiver, hidden from 
the pilot’s view, to note the actual distance from 
the checkpoint.  This measure represented the 
pilot’s navigational error. 
 
Upon reaching the last checkpoint in the circuit, 
the experimenter intervened and announced a 
revision to the original plan for the flight.  
Instead of returning home, all sixteen pilots were 
asked to once again fly the circuit consisting of 
the previous six checkpoints, only this time, 
without any navigation resources available to 
them.  In the case of the Pilotage group, the 
experimenter took away the sectional chart.  In 
the case of the GPS/Moving Map group, the 
experimenter took away the sectional chart and 
turned off the GPS and moving map display. 
 
After the first checkpoint, the experimenter again 
asked each pilot to rate their own navigational 
awareness in the current situation: flying with no 
navigational resources other than any knowledge 
about the area and airspace that they had 
collected during the first time over the 
checkpoints. 
 
The sixteen pilots flew over the loop of six 
checkpoints once again, reported crossing each 
checkpoint, while the experimenter again noted 




Navigation Error. The mean navigational errors 
for the two groups of eight pilots during the first 























Figure 1. Navigational accuracy with all 
navigational resources available. 
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The mean navigational error and standard 
deviation for the Pilotage group was 1.1 NM (1.5 
NM), while the mean and standard deviation for 
the GPS/Moving Map group was 0.2 NM (0.3 
NM).  Although the means for both groups fell 
well within the general 3 NM navigation 
standard for pilotage and dead reckoning cited in 
the Private Pilot Practical Test Standards [FAA, 
2002], the GPS/Moving Map group achieved a 
significantly higher degree of navigation 
accuracy, t = 3.74, p < 0.01. 
 
The mean navigational errors for the two groups 
of eight pilots during the second pass through the 
circuit, when pilots had no navigation resources 
























Figure 2.   Navigational accuracy with no 
navigational resources available. 
 
The mean navigational error and standard 
deviation for the Pilotage group was 1.3 NM (0.7 
NM), while the mean and standard deviation for 
the GPS/Moving Map group was 4.9 NM (7.9 
NM).  Again, there was a significant difference 
between the two groups, only this time the 
situation was reversed: the Pilotage group 
performed significantly more accurately (t = 
2.17, p < 0.05). 
 
Error measures and statistics aside, there was a 
categorical difference in performance between 
the two groups.  All eight pilots in the Pilotage 
group performed within the 3 NM minimum 
standard suggested in the practical test standards, 
while only one-half of the pilots in the 
GPS/Moving Map group met the standard.  
Regardless of how one chooses to statistically 
consider the two large average errors shown in 
Figure 2, these two cases have a practical 
significance.  These two pilots were wholly 
unable to find their way back to point where they 
started, reporting this checkpoint to be 25 NM 
and 41 NM away from its actual location.   
Self-Ratings of Navigational Awareness. Every 
pilot was asked to rate their navigational 
awareness in three different situations:  
 
1) Prior to traversing the circuit of 
checkpoints, every pilot was asked to 
rate their navigational awareness in the 
situation they were currently flying.  
That is, the Pilot group was asked to 
rate their awareness when using a 
sectional chart, while the GPS/Moving 
Map group rated their awareness when 
using a GPS, moving map, and 
sectional chart. 
2) Prior to traversing the circuit of 
checkpoints, every pilot was asked to 
rate what their navigational awareness 
would be if they were flying in the other 
experimental condition.  That is, the 
Pilotage group hypothesized what their 
awareness would be if they had the GPS 
and moving map available, while the 
GPS/Moving Map group rated 
themselves using only a sectional chart. 
3) While traversing the circuit of 
checkpoints for the second time, every 
pilot was asked to rate their awareness 
in their current situation: with no 
navigational resources available. 
 
Table 1 shows the navigational awareness ratings 
given by pilots in both groups. 
 
Table 1. Subjective self-estimates 











7.625 9 8.125 
GPS/Moving 
Map Group 
6.625 9 4.875 
 
Pilots in both groups rated awareness to be 
significantly greater when a GPS and moving 
map were being used (t = 3.47, p < 0.01).  The 
interesting result is the significant difference 
between the two groups when they were 
confronted with the task of flying the circuit for 
the second time, with their navigation resources 
taken away.  Pilotage group pilots rated 
themselves significantly higher than the 
GPS/Moving Map group pilots, and these ratings 
matched their performance.  The GPS/Moving 
Map group pilots not only rated themselves 
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significantly lower than the Pilotage group pilots 
(t = 3.38, p < 0.01), but also significantly lower 
than themselves when flying with the GPS and 




One interpretation of the results from 
Experiment 1 is that the observed drop in pilot 
navigational awareness was due to the passive 
role assumed by pilots when using equipment 
that automates the navigation task.  This second 
experiment aimed to directly test that hypothesis.  
In this second experiment, different pilots were 
asked to perform the same navigation task while 
performing an additional task that required them 
to be more actively engaged in the navigation 
process.  This additional task was to ask pilots to 
point out geographical features of interest as they 
made their way between the checkpoints.  The 
research question is whether or not this 
additional involvement would result in improved 
performance when pilots were surprised with the 
task of navigating around the circuit with no 




The same criteria used in the previous study 
were used to recruit additional eight pilots.  All 
pilots reported that they were wholly unaware of 





The same Diamond DA40 (Diamond Star) 





As with the first study, the data were collected in 
Northern California, during July and August, 
under VFR conditions with a reported visibility 
of greater than six statute miles at all nearby 
airports.  Prior to engine start, pilots were told 
that the flight would require them to navigate 
along a series of nine cross-country checkpoints.  
Pilots were instructed to fly over each checkpoint 
as accurately as possible, and to report when they 
believed that they were directly over each 
checkpoint.  Pilots were free to choose altitudes 
appropriate for VFR flight at their discretion.  
All eight pilots had available a sectional chart 
and a GPS with a color moving map display.  
The experimenter confirmed that each pilot was 
familiar with the basic features of the GPS and 
moving map prior to departure.  The series of 
nine checkpoints was programmed into the GPS 
prior to takeoff. 
 
En route to each checkpoint, pilots were asked to 
choose and point out three geographical features 
of interest.  Pilots were told that they did not 
have to know anything about the geographical 
features they pointed out, or look up any 
information about them.   
 
As pilots reported reaching each checkpoint, the 
experimenter used a second GPS receiver, 
hidden from the pilot’s view, to record the true 
distance from the checkpoint.   
 
After completing the circuit of six checkpoints, 
the experimenter took away the sectional chart, 
turned off the GPS and moving map, and 
(unexpectedly) asked each pilot to fly the circuit 
of six checkpoints again. 
 
The eight pilots flew over the loop of six 
checkpoints once again, reported crossing each 
checkpoint, while the experimenter again noted 




The purpose of the present study was to measure 
the effect of pointing out geographical features 
of interest on navigational awareness.  For this 
reason, the results for this group of pilots are 
compared to the two groups from the first 
experiment.  Thus, the analyses below present 
data for three groups: 
 
(1) Pilotage: Pilots who used sectional 
charts only [from Experiment 1]; 
(2) GPS/Map: Pilots who used sectional 
charts, GPS, and moving maps 
[Experiment 1]; 
(3) GPS/Map with Callouts: Pilots who 
used sectional charts, GPS, moving 
maps, and pointed out geographical 
features of interest. 
 
Navigation Error: First Pass. The graph in 
Figure 3 shows the mean navigational errors 
during the first pass through the checkpoints for 
the three groups of pilots.   
 
The mean navigational error and standard 
deviation for the three groups were:  Pilotage = 
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1.1 NM (1.5 NM); GPS/Map = 0.2 NM (0.3 



























Figure 3. Navigational accuracy with all 
navigational resources available. 
 
During the first pass through the circuit, with all 
navigational resources available, the group that 
pointed out geographical features was 
statistically indistinguishable from the GPS/Map 
group in the previous study that did not point out 
geographical features.  The GPS/Map with 
Callouts group performed as well as the 
GPS/Map group, and significantly better than the 
Pilotage group (t = 3.48, p < 0.01), although all 
three groups performed within the 3 NM 
navigation standard cited in the Private Pilot 
Practical Test Standard (FAA, 2002). 
 
Navigation Error: Second Pass The graph in 
Figure 4 shows the mean navigational errors 
during the second pass through the circuit for all 
three groups: when pilots had all navigation 



























Figure 4. Navigational accuracy with no 
navigational resources available. 
 
The data in Figure 4 show that the practice of 
choosing and pointing out geographical features 
resulted in a significant improvement in 
navigational performance for users of GPS and 
moving maps.  While the mean navigational 
error for the GPS/Map group was 4.92 NM (7.92 
NM), navigational error for the GPS/Map group 
that pointed out geographical features was 1.53 




The results of the first experiment clearly show 
that pilots believe that GPS and moving maps 
categorically enhance pilot navigational 
awareness, when in fact they do not.  Pilots may 
consider navigational awareness to extend 
beyond what the pilot is aware of in the 
traditional sense.  That is, pilots may have 
considered the information stored inside the 
computer to be part of their awareness.   
 
The results of the second experiment suggest that 
the loss of navigational awareness may be related to 
pilots’ understanding of their own role in the 
cockpit when GPS and moving maps are used.  It 
may be that pilots have a natural tendency to 
assume a passive role when these systems are used.  
The simple intervention employed in Experiment 2 
suggests that a more cooperative relationship 
between pilot and advanced systems might deliver 
more of the promised benefits of advanced systems.   
 
A more complete description of Experiment 1 
can be found in Casner (2005). A more complete 
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